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Corporate Officer Liability Under
SMCRA: A Statutory Exception
to Limited Liability
INTRODUCTION
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA)' is the final product of numerous legislative attempts
2
to promulgate federal guidelines and regulations for surface
mining.' Although the congressional debates ceased when SMCRA
was enacted, the battle among coal operators, environmentalists,
and regulatory agencies has escalated. 4 While the courts have
tentatively addressed some challenges to SMCRA,5 there are
many areas awaiting resolution-including implementation of the
individual liability provision.
6
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as SMCRA].
I See generally S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60, reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 593; McGraw, Surface Mining Primacy for Kentucky:
The Legal Implications, 71 Ky. L.J. 37, 38 n.3 (1982-83); Note, A Summary of the
Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the
Relevant Legal Periodical Literature, 81 W. VA. L. Rav. 775, 775-83 (1979); Comment,
Statutory Comments, 25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. R v. 953, 953 n.1 (1979-80). While there is no
longer a struggle in Congress to pass a federal surface mining law, legislative action to
modify SMCRA continues. See, e.g., Bratt, Surface Mining in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J.
7, 9 nn.15-16 (1982-83).
1 According to SMCRA, surface mining includes:
contour, strip, auger, mountain removal, box cut, open pit, and area
mining, the uses of explosives and blasting, and in site distillation or
retorting, leaching or other chemical or physical processing, and the clean-
ing, concentrating, or other processing or preparation, loading of coal for
interstate commerce at or near the mine site....
30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(A) (1982). This comprehensive definition underscores the legislative
intent to stringently regulate surface mining.
4 For an illustrative list, see Bratt, supra note 2, at 9 n.14, and Comment, supra
note 2, at 953 n.2.
I Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981);
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (both opinions were limited in scope because the
cases presented facial challenges to the statute's validity). See generally Bratt, supra note
2, at 11-18. The Supreme Court will review the civil penalty prepayment provision in
the near future since Moore v. United States, 53 U.S.L. W. 3021 (U.S. July 3, 1984)
(No. 84-41), is on the Supreme Court docket. (The lower court ruling found the civil
penalty prepayment provision of SMCRA meets constitutional due process requirements.
United States v. Moore, No. 82-5478 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1984)).
6 SMCRA § 518(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1268(f) (1982).
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Under both SMCRA 7 and the Kentucky surface mining act s
(Kentucky Act), when a corporate permittee9 violates perform-
ance standards, the corporate officers can be held individually
liable.' 0 However, the individual liability provision has not been
used effectively in Kentucky." The Kentucky Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet (Cabinet) has imple-
mented the civil penalty provisions 12 against corporate permittees
but has made no measurable effort to assess penalties against
individual corporate officers. 3 As a result, millions of dollars
of outstanding penalties assessed against the corporate entity lie
dormant in accounts receivable records. 14 More importantly, the
While primary responsibility for enforcing surface mining laws belongs to the
state, see infra note 8, the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) of the Department of the
Interior (Department), established pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (1982), administers the
Federal program and oversees State Programs. See generally McGraw, supra note 2, at
43.
, The Kentucky surface mining act [hereinafter cited as the Kentucky Act] is
codified at Ky. RE V. STAT. §§ 350.010 -. 990 (1984) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. For an
excellent discussion of the Kentucky Permanent Program, see McGraw, supra note 2.
1 The enforcement provisions of SMCRA and the regulations thereunder "are not
avoided by the failure of a person to obtain a state permit.... The definition of
'permittee' adopted by the Secretary for the initial regulatory program ... includes
those persons who fail to obtain a State permit before conducting surface coal mining
and reclamation operations regulated by a state." Claypool Construction Co., 1 IBSMA
259, 260 (86 ID 486) (Sept. 26, 1979).
10 For a discussion of limited liability of corporate shareholders, see infra notes
16-28 and accompanying text.
,, 1984 OSM SEcoND ANN. EVALUATION oF Ky. SuRPACE MMNo ANM) REcLAMA-
TION PROoRAM 65 [hereinafter cited as 2D AmiuAL EVALUATiON]. See infra text accom-
panying notes 54-58 and notes 98-99. For notice of availability, see 48 Fed. Reg. 3837
(Aug. 23, 1983). The Annual Evaluation Report on the Administration of State Regu-
latory & Abandoned Mine Land Programs Under SMCRA can be obtained from the
following: Division of State Program Assistance, OSM, 1951 Constitution Ave., N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20240, or Lexington Field Office, OSM, 340 Legion Drive, Suite 28,
Lexington, KY 40504.
2 Civil penalties for the federal program are set out in 30 U.S.C. § 1268(i) (1982)
which states: "As a condition of approval of any State program ... the civil and
criminal provisions thereof shall at a minimum, incorporate penalties no less stringent
than those set forth in this section.. " KRS § 350.990 contains the civil penalties
under the state program.
3 Corporate officers and shareholders were named as respondents in Leslie Coal
& Energy Engineering, No. 1766-IlI-15 (Ky. DNREP Jan. 15, 1981). See ifra notes 59-
62 and accompanying text. See also, Bratt, supra note 2, at 31-34.
'4 The Cabinet is unable to collect these penalties because the corporate entity is
only a shell which exists for the sole purpose of insulating corporate individuals.
Generally, the Cabinet is able to collect only those fines which are voluntarily paid. It
is estimated that less than ten percent of the assessed penalties are ever collected.
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"envisioned" 15 deterrence factor is largely negated by the Cabi-
net's inaction.
This comment will analyze corporate officer liability under
SMCRA and the Kentucky Act and the problems related to
enforcing this liability by first addressing the limited liability of
corporate officers and then examining the statutory provisions
authorizing enforcement of penalties against corporate officers.
Finally, the federal and state enforcement systems will be dis-
cussed.
I. LIMITED LIABILITY
"It is well established that a corporate structure is a separate
legal entity which has the legitimate purpose of insulating
individuals from personal liability for acts done on behalf of
the corporation.'
6
Interview with Charles Kurtz, Office of General Counsel, Ky. Nat. Res. & Env. Protec-
tion Cabinet (September 12, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Kurtz Interview]. In support of
this, a Cabinet intra-office memorandum (Fines Receivable Report) regarding "extraor-
dinary assessments due and owing to the Cabinet" lists assessments from $100,000 to
$34,352,000. One notation states "the Cabinet's Accounts Receivable through February
29, 1984: $56,727,424.43." Id. Fiscal years 1982, 1983, and through March 19, 1984
were included in the Fines Receivable Report, (March 19, 1984).
11 Even before SMCRA was enacted, there was doubt cast upon the future effec-
tiveness of individual civil penalties as drafted. These reservations were expressed in a
subcommittee hearing by counsel for environmentalists. The testimony in pertinent part
follows:
[Section] 518 as presently drafted will not achieve its purpose of deter-
rence .... The purpose of the civil penalty provision under H.R. 2 ... is
to induce those officials responsible for the operation of a mine to comply
with the substantive standards established by the statutory scheme. As the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee has stated: To be successful
in this objective a penalty should be of an amount which is sufficient to
make it more economical for an operator to comply ... than it is to pay
the penalty assessed and continue to operate while not in compliance.
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 87 (1977) (testimony of counselors J. Davitt McAteer and L. Thomas Galloway)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Because the civil penalties of SMCRA were modeled
after civil penalties of the Mine Safety Act, the counselors utilized the major problem
areas of the Mine Safety Program to forecast a repeated fiasco: "[A] glimpse into the
dismal history of the civil penalty program of the Mine Safety Act... should be enough
to show that transplanting the system unchanged into H.R. 2 will almost surely result
in a dismal 'mess'...." Id.
16 Malisewski v. Singer, 598 P.2d 1014, 1015 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
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One of the major advantages for transacting business as a
corporation is the limited liability of the shareholder.17 Many
jurisdictionsIs recognize "Ig]enerally, the shareholder's liability
for corporate obligations is limited to what he has invested in
the corporation."'' 9 The general rule of limited liability states:
"A holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation shall be
under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors with
respect to such share other than the obligation to pay to the
corporation the full consideration for which such shares were
issued or to be issued.'' 2 This principle is often incorporated in
a typical stockholder's provision.2'
Kentucky has long recognized this century old principle of
limited liability.22 While the Kentucky courts have demonstrated
"a general aversion for any disregard of the corporate entity,"23
limited liability is not an absolute rule. Under appropriate cir-
cumstances, the court will utilize common law methods to "pierce
the corporate veil.''24 Moreover, state and federal statutes have
been enacted to impose civil and criminal liability on corporate
7 H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 73 (2d ed. 1970).
" "In a few jurisdictions, unlimited liability corporations are still possible." Id.
9 Id.
z' MODEL BusINEsS CORPORATION ACT § 25 (rev. ed. 1979).
2, The provision may take one of many forms:
The private property of the stockholders of this corporation shall not be
liable for [or "shall be forever exempt from"] the debts, obligations or
liabilities of this corporation [or "no stockholder shall be liable for the
debts of the corporation in any amount greater that his unpaid subscrip-
tion" or to extent stated].
[Another form.] The private property of the stockholders of this corpo-
ration shall not be liable for corporate debts, and this article shall not be
amended or changed except by unanimous consent of all the stockholders
of the corporation in writing.
[Another form.] The private property of the stockholders shall not be
subject to the payment of corporate debts to any extent whatever.
IA FI.ETCHER CORPORATION FORMS ANNOTATED § 1127 (4th ed. 1982).
KRS § 271A.125(5) (1981) establishes: "A shareholder of a corporation shall
not be personally liable for any debt or liability of the corporation, except as he may
be liable by reason of his own conduct or acts." See generally HEm supra note 17, at
§ 73; Campbell, Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders: Myth or Matter-of-Fact,
63 Ksy. L.J. 23 (1974-75). The concept of limited liability was not an inherent charac-
teristic of English corporate law.
Thermothrift Ind. v. Mono-Therm Insul. Systems, 450 F. Supp. 398, 405 (V.D.Ky.
1978); see also Campbell, supra note 22, at 48.
14 See generally I FLETcHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 41.30 (1983); Campbell,
supra note 22, at 33-35.
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officers or directors for acts, omissions, or violations of the
corporation. 25 These judicial and legislative actions have estab-
lished exceptions to the limited liability concept. 26 Since judicial
"piercing of the corporate veil" is applied on a case by case
basis, it is difficult to predict when a court will disregard the
corporate entity and impose corporate officer liability. 27 Al-
though the parameters of statutory liability should be more
readily ascertainable than those of judicially imposed liability,
this is not necessarily the case since the scope and implementa-
tion of a statutory exception may be as dubious as the methods
and application of "piercing the corporate veil." Corporate
officer liability under SMCRA is illustrative.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Both SMCRA and the Kentucky Act contain an exception
to the general rule of limited liability. The exception provision
in SMCRA 28 allows both civil penalties and criminal sanctions
for violations, with statutory liability being imposed on the
corporate officers, directors, or agents individually as well as
the corporate entity. The SMCRA provision states:
Whenever a corporate permittee violates a condition of a per-
mit issued pursuant to a Federal program, a Federal lands
program, or Federal enforcement pursuant to Section 1252 of
this title, or Federal Enforcement of a State program pursuant
to Section 1271 of this title, or fails or refuses to comply with
any order issued under Section 1271 of this title, or any order
incorporated in a final decision issued by the Secretary under
this chapter except in an order incorporated in a decision issued
under Subsection (b) of this Section or Section 1293 of this
title, any director, officer, or agent of such corporation who
Is Among Kentucky statutes which erode the concept of limited liability are KRS
§ 141.430(2) (1982) (imposing individual liability for nonpayment of withholding tax);
KRS § 502.060 (1985) (imposing criminal liability to prevent any "person" from hiding
behind a corporation to avoid criminal liability for his conduct). See also Butts v.
Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1979).
26 Although courts generally recognize exceptions, the concept of limited liability
has not been completely destroyed. "[T]he limited liability rule appears to be as firmly
embedded as ever as a landmark institution." Meiners, Piercing the Veil of Limited
Liability, 4 DEL. J. CoR". L. 351, 357 (1979).
2, See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 22, at 55; Meiners, supra note 26, at 354-57.
n SMCRA § 518 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1268 (1982)).
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willfully and knowingly authorized, ordered, or carried out
such violation, failure, or refusal shall be subject to the same
civil penalties, fines, and imprisonment that may be imposed
upon a person under subsection (a) and (e) of this Section.29
The Kentucky Act incorporated the substantive parts of this
provision in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 350.990(9). 0
Although these provisions seem clear at first glance, a closer
examination reveals scope and enforceability issues.
A. Definitions
Although the provisions expressly name officers, directors,
and agents as parties subject to penalties, fines, and imprison-
ment, there remains the problem of identifying the individuals
to whom the provisions are applicable. 1 Since there are no
definitions in either SMCRA or the Kentucky Act which are
helpful, other sources must be examined.32 Legislative history of
SMCRA indicates that Congress intended for the provision to
apply to corporate officers and other officials responsible for
the mining operation and for compliance with the regulatory
standards. One such document submitted by the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources states: "[sjubsection (g) provides
that the same penalties apply to the officers of a corporation
which violates the provisions of this Act, as to an individual.
' 3
However, no evidence has been found to indicate whether the
Senate intended to include any corporate agent without giving
consideration to the amount of control the individual possessed.
SMCRA § 518(f) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1268(f) (1982)). (Emphasis added.)
- KRS § 350.990(9) (1983) states:
Whenever a corporate permittee violates any provision of this chapter or
regulation pursuant thereto or fails or refuses to comply with any final
order issued by the Secretary, any director, officer or agent of such
corporation who willfully and knowingly authorized, ordered, or carried
out such violation, failure or refusal shall be subject to the same civil
penalties, fines, and imprisonment as may be imposed upon a person
pursuant to this section (emphasis added).
" See Bratt, supra note 2, at 31. Bratt's discussion focuses on the party responsible
for payment of a "properly assessed" civil penalty.
32 Directive, Individual Civil Penalty Assessment, INE-4, Transmittal Number 193,
(issued Oct. 19, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Directive].
11 S. REP. No. 128, supra note 2, at 86. The individual penalty provision was
included in § 418(g) of S. 7. The substance of the provision was the same as Section
518(0 in H.R. 2. SMCRA is an enactment of H.R. 2.
[Vol. 1: 153
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A more enlightening analysis of the provision comes from
comparing and contrasting it to section 109 of the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (MSHA).3 One noted
similarity of the two sections is that "[t]he purpose of a civil
penalty ... is to induce those officials responsible for the op-
eration of a mine to comply with the substantive standards
established by the statutory scheme." 31 Although this language
came from legal counsel for the environmentalist group rather
than the legislature, the counselors' interpretation of the statu-
tory language36 is persuasive.
Furthermore, in United States v. Dix Fork Coal Co.,37 the
Sixth Circuit similarly defined agent. There, the Office of Sur-
face Mining (OSM) had issued a Cessation Order (CO) and
Notice of Violation (NOV) requiring Dix Fork to take affirma-
tive action to alleviate the danger created by aggravated land
slides "located above a public road and residential area,"' '
which resulted in "an immediate and hazardous danger to the
health or safety of the public. ' ' 39 When Dix Fork failed to take
corrective action, the Secretary of the Interior initiated an en-
forcement action. When the district court ordered Dix Fork and
its corporate agent, Wilford Niece, to comply by performing the
necessary remedial actions, Dix Fork appealed the order. After
responding to the questions of federal jurisdiction4° and absten-
tion,4' the appellate court interpreted the enforcement provision
at issue, which in pertinent part provides: "The Secretary may
request the Attorney General to institute a civil action for relief
... whenever such permittee or his agent (A) violates or fails
3' Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§
801-960 (1976)), amended by 30 U.S.C. §§ 822-962 (Supp. IV 1980) (now known as the
Federal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1977) [hereinafter cited as MSHAJ. For a
legislative statement of the similarities of the two programs, see S. RE. No. 128, supra
note 2, at 58.
, Hearings, supra note 15, at 454 (emphasis added).
The words in question are "director, officer or agent".
" 692 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 438.
I ld.
10 Id. Dix Fork argued the operation was exempt from SMCRA because it affected
less than two acres. The court construed "affect" to include acreage actually affected
rather than acreage authorized to be affected by the operation.
"4 Id. Because the issue of abstention was not presented to the district court, the
court did not address it on appeal.
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to comply with any order or decision issued by the Secretary
under this chapter .... -42
On appeal, Niece argued he was not an "agent" of Dix Fork
in the sense of subjecting himself to personal liability under
SMCRA. The court rejected the "common-law definitions of
the term agent ' 43 offered by both Niece and the Attorney Gen-
eral. After stating that "neither the Act nor regulations pro-
mulgated thereunder [define] the term 'agent',"" the court turned
to MSHA for a definition of agent. 45 The court concluded "[tIhe
agent subjected to liability under the Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act is the person 'charged with responsibility' for the
operation which potentially may violate the purposes and policy
of the legislative framework." 46 By analogy, the court defined
an agent under SMCRA as "that person charged with the re-
sponsibility for protecting society and the environment from the
adverse effects of the surface mining operation and particularly
charged with effectuating compliance with environmental per-
formance standards during the course of a permittee's mining
operation. 1
47
Applying this definition to Niece, the court found Niece to
be an agent under SMCRA. In reaching this conclusion, the
court strongly emphasized Niece's role, "as Dix Fork's spokes-
man to OSM and as advisor to Dix Fork in all matters concern-
ing compliance with the Act." 4 Furthermore, the "[r]efusal...
to implement affirmative obligations on Niece as an agent would
permit circumvention of the Act through the establishment of a
sham corporation." 49 Although Dix Fork has been criticized for
finding Niece subject to liability when Niece was not individually
named on the NOV or the CO,1O the case provides judicial
41 30 U.S.C § 1371(c) (1982); Dix Fork, 692 F.2d at 439.
41 Dix Fork, 692 F.2d at 439 n.1.
" Id. at 441.
41 MSHA, supra note 34.
- Dix Fork, 692 F.2d at 440.
" Id. (Emphasis added.) The approach used and the definition derived are remarkably
consistent with the hearing testimony. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 454.
, Dix Fork, 692 F.2d at 439.
"9 Id. at 441.
" Id. The court rejected Niece's due process argument on two grounds. First, the
court found Niece had received constructive notice. In so concluding, the court stated
OSM had been led to believe Niece was the actual owner of the company. Second, the
court stated that 30 U.S.C. § 1271(c) permits "issuing orders and then seeking judicial
enforcement." See, e.g., Comment, Sixth Circuit Interprets Agent Under Surface Mining
Act, 24 NAT. REs. J. 801, 801-04 (1984).
[Vol. 1: 153
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guidance for corporations and their agents in ascertaining poten-
tial liability under SMCRA.
Although Kentucky courts have not been faced with the task
of defining the term agent as used in the Kentucky Act,5 Ken-
tucky statutory law defines agent in the Kentucky Penal Code
provision for corporate liability as "any officer, director, servant
or employe of the corporation or any other person authorized
to act in behalf of the corporation. 52 Furthermore, a person is
"criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he
performs or causes to be performed, in the name of or in behalf
of a corporation to the same extent as if the conduct were
performed in his own name or behalf." 3
A broad reading of Dix Fork may suggest the term should
be construed to include any employee authorized to act according
to company policy in "effectuating compliance with environ-
mental performance standards during the course of a permittee's
mining operations." '5 4 However, a more reasonable reading of
Dix Fork suggests the more appropriate definition is that found
in the Kentucky statute: a " 'high managerial agent' . . . an
officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation
who has duties of such responsibility that his conduct reasonably
may be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation." 5
This definition of agent is supported by the express purpose of
SMCRA to "assure that surface coal mining operations are so
conducted as to protect the environment. '5 6 Furthermore, min-
ing operations are generally conducted in the manner established
by the policy-making individuals and implemented by individuals
in positions of major responsibility. Regardless of the approach
taken, the conclusion is the same: both SMCRA and the Ken-
tucky Act impose personal liability on corporate individuals who
are responsible for policy-making and operation of the mine.57
11 Kentucky incorporated section 518(), without modification, into the Kentucky
Act. For this reason it is appropriate to look to state law for a definition of agent. See
supra text accompanying note 30.
2 KRS § 502.060 (1985).
KRS § 502.050(2)(a) (1985).
Dix Fork, 692 F.2d at 440.
KRS § 502.050(2)(b) (1985). (Emphasis added.)
30 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (1982).
For a discussion of the meaning of "operator," see Wombles v. Commonwealth,
328 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1959). See also Bratt, supra note 2, at 19 n.78.
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B. Enforcement
Once an applicable class of individuals has been identified,
enforcement of the provision must be addressed. One of the
express purposes of SMCRA was to "establish a nationwide
program to protect society and the environment from the adverse
effects of surface coal mining operations." s Recognizing the
potential ineffectiveness of obligatory mining reclamation stand-
ards, the legislature drafted a comprehensive enforcement
scheme.59 Clearly, the legislature intended penalties to be utilized
as an effective enforcement tool. 60 However, contrary to legis-
lative intent, there has been little implementation of the penalty
provision at either the federal or state level.
1. On the Federal Level
Although OSM has shown little effort in the area of enforc-
ing the penalty provisions, 6' two ongoing legal battles initiated
by environmentralists have drawn judicial and public attention
to the federal enforcement program.62 First, in Save Our Cum-
30 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1982).
- H.R. RE. No. 218, 95th Cong., Ist. Sess. 129. reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDe
CONO. & ADrm. Nows 593, 660 reads:
H.R. 2 contains comprehensive provisions for inspections, enforcement
notices and orders, administrative and judicial review, and penalties. These
requirements are of equal importance to the provisions of the bill regarding
mining and reclamation performance standards since experience with State
surface mining reclamation laws has amply demonstrated that the most
effective reclamation occurs when sound performance standards go hand
in hand with strong, equitable enforcement mechanisms.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
- Before contesting a penalty, the person charged must prepay the proposed
penalty into an escrow account. SMCRA § 518(c) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c)
(1982)). The legislative intent behind the provision was clear:
A major issue was presented by the House bill's inclusion of language in
Section 518(e) that would allow the Secretary to take civil penalties owed
by the operator from the performance bond posted to assure reclamation
of the area upon default. The Senate amendment had no similar provision.
The House receded to the Senate on this issue.
H.R. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 593, 728.
" 5 SURFACE Mmnrn; REP. No. 3, 96 (March 1984) [hereinafter cited as SMR No.
3].
, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982) authorizes citizen participation to compel compliance.
[Vol. 1: 153
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berland Mountains, Inc. v. Watt, 63 two environmentalist orga-
nizations alleged that the Department of Interior (Department)
had not enforced mandatory civil penalties against SMCRA vi-
olators who had been issued a CO. 61 United States District Judge
Barrington D. Parker rejected the Department's argument that
the Secretary's duty under the provision was discretionary.
6
1
Judge Parker also rejected the Secretary's argument of imprac-
ticality of enforcement.
6
On appeal, the court merely found that venue in Washington,
D.C. was improper and did not even address the penalty en-
forcement issue. 67 An out-of-court settlement has been reached
in that case but has not been formally accepted by the federal
court. If the court of appeals remands the case back to Judge
Parker, "[tihere's no guarantee Parker will agree to the order
'"6
in light of Parker's past tough stand on enforcement. While the
order provides for enforcement against individuals as well as
corporate violators, the potential effectiveness of the plan is
questionable. However, the court order is a positive step for
environmentalists in their ongoing battle to enforce the statutory
scheme.
6 550 F. Supp. 979 (D.D.C. 1982).
- Id. at 980. "In review this year . . . congressional auditors estimated that the
uncollected penalties against strip mine violators might total $150 million. The magnitude
of the never paid fines . . . has given [Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Watt] the
working name of 'the megabucks case.' " Officials blocking mining suit's settlement
(sic), Lexington Herald-Leader, Oct. 7, 1984, at A12, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Lex-
ington Herald].
" Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc., 550 F. Supp. at 981-83.
The Secretary grounded his impracticality argument on the 30 day notice re-
quirement of § 1268(c) and the cost of enforcement.
61 Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725 F.2d 1434, 1437 (D.C.Cir.
1984); Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725 F.2d 1422, 1426-31 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
" 5 SURFACE MINING REP. No. 11, 178 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited as SMR No.
11 (Nov. 1984)]. The order provides for a computer system "to track non-paying
violators," enforcement assistance from state agencies, and collection efforts by OSM.
The computer system is to contain the identity of owners and officers of entities owing
penalties. Armed with this information, OSM is "to request the state agency involved
with the applicant to refuse the permit or revoke a permit already issued." Id. at 178.
If the state agency does not act within OSM's specified time period, OSM can take
further steps by issuing an NOV "ceasing all operations under that permit until all
cessation orders are abated, all civil penalties are paid or an appropriate abatement plan
or payment schedule is approved by OSM." Id. Individuals with assets less than $50,000
will not be subjected to OSM's collection efforts. Id.
1985]
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Second, in Council of Southern Mountains v. Watt,69 U.S.
District Judge Oliver Gasch instructed OSM "to act against coal
operators who knowingly violate federal surface mining laws." 70
Gasch's order was prompted by the agency's failure to comply
with the terms of a 1980 settlement of the original suit.71 A 1979
action72 charged that- "OSM had failed to carry out its manda-
tory duties under Section 518(0 of the federal surface mining
act."71 3 In 1984 the environmentalists returned to court to follow
up their "push to get OSM to use all the enforcement tools
available in the law to ensure violation-free mining-including
action against individuals and not just corporations. '"74
In response to Gasch's order, OSM "[scrambled] to review
the mining abuse cases in a short time after several years of
moribund activity. ''71 The agency's review resulted in a recom-
mendation of "criminal prosecution of 108 cases out of 1,287
CO's issued to corporate permittees since March 30, 1980.' 76
OSM has recommended civil penalties in 216 additional cases."
As the next step "[tihe solicitor's office will decide which of the
recommended cases will be referred to the Justice Department
for action."78 Whatever the outcome, the environmentalists will
undoubtedly continue to scrutinize the citizen participation pro-:
vision.79
2. On the State Level
Until recently, the Kentucky Cabinet had failed to establish
a set policy for enforcing penalties against corporate officers.
"Council of Southern Mountains, Inc., v. Watt, No. 81-CA-530-MR (D.D.C.
Jan. 20, 1984), reported in 5 SURFACE Mnno RaP. No. 4, 106 (April 1984) [hereinafter
cited as SMR No. 5 (April 1984)]. This case involves action on infractions from March
30, 1980 until the present, whereas the "megabucks case," supra note 64, involves
infractions since passage of SMCRA.
SMR No. 3, at %.
I ld.
Id. The 1979 suit resulted in a settlement which environmentalists charge OSM
of violating.
7 Id.
'4 SMR No. 4 (April 1984).
" Id.
7Id. The same two individuals are involved in 67 of the 108 cases recommended
for criminal action.
" Id. There are more individuals involved in the civil penalty cases "because more
than one person can be responsible for violations in a single closure order."
" Id. See generally Lexington Herald, supra note 64 (Justice Department blocked
settlement in the "megabucks" case).
30 U.S.C. § 1270, supra note 62, at 10.
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and agents individuallyY' OSM addresses this problem in its
1984 Annual Evaluation of the Kentucky Permanent Program.$'
OSM found "[tihe use of individual civil penalties, as outlined
in 405 KAR Section 11(4), is left up to the discretion of each
attorney. No office-wide policy nor Department involvement has
been initiated to implement this provision.' '82 The agency has
identified historical and current problems which block enforce-
ment.83
Leslie Coal & Energy Engineering"I is demonstrative of the
problem. Corporate individuals were named as respondents along
with the corporate permittee for a variety of violations. Leslie
Coal did not contest the violations, but argued that it was not
an operator"' within the meaning of the Kentucky Act since
"another company did the actual mining under a contract ar-
rangement." Rejecting this argument, the hearing officer con-
cluded Leslie Coal was an operator under the statutory regulations
and remained responsible to the Cabinet for the permit. Al-
though the Cabinet sought to bar Leslie Coal and the individual
parties from mining, the hearing officer found the Cabinet "could
revoke Leslie Coal's permit and forfeit its bond."' Further, the
o Kurtz Interview, supra note 14.
" 2D ANNUAL EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 65.
52 Id.
51 In the past, Kentucky's corporation law effectively prevented any attempt to
hold corporate officers individually responsible for acts done while a cor-
poration was in existence. Now KRS 350.990(9) abrogates the old law in
the area of surface mining regulation and will allow individual civil pen-
alties to be collected. Problems preventing the effective use of individual
civil penalties are: each attorney is on his or her own in deciding when to
go after an individual civil penalty; no major cases have yet to be decided
by State circuit or appellate courts; and Department personnel do not get
involved, each attorney does all of the investigation himself or herself.
2D ANNUAL EVALUATiON, supra note Il, at 65. See also text accompanying notes 16-27
supra for a discussion of limited liability.
- Leslie Coal & Energy Engineering, No. 1766-I11-15 (Ky. DNREP Jan 15., 1981)
I REp. No. 9, 121 (Feb. 1981) (now known as SURFACE MINING REPORTER). See also
Bratt, supra note 2, at 31.
" KRS § 350.010(6) (1983) defines operations as "surface coal mining operations,
all of the premises, facilities, roads and equipment used in the process of producing
coal from a designated area or removing overburden for the purpose of determining the
location, quality or quantity of a natural coal deposit or the activity to facilitate or
accomplish the extraction or the removal of coal." Leslie Coal argued that it was not
an operator under a similar definition. Leslie Coal, I REP. No. 9, 121 (Feb. 1981).
m Leslie Coal, I REP. No. 9, 121 (Feb. 1981).
"Id.
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hearing officer concluded an administrative hearing "is not the
proper forum in which to pierce the corporate veil and thus
[find] the Respondents individually liable for the civil penalties.""
The Secretary adopted the hearing officer's conclusion re-
garding civil penalties, but found the Cabinet had statutory
authority for barring permittees and individuals from receiving
" 'directly or indirectly' permits issued by DNREP."' 9 Neither
the hearing officer nor the Secretary addressed the fact that the
Kentucky Act authorizes subjecting the individuals to civil and
criminal liability. 90 This provision in effect erodes the concept
of limited liability for corporate officers and eliminates the need
to resort to common law methods of imposing individual liabil-
ity. This provision was not implemented in Leslie Coal.
In addition to the problems identified by OSM, 91 the Cabinet
has delayed implementation of the corporate liability provision
because of due process concerns which have been expressed by
practitioners and commentators.Y Both state and federal regu-
latory agencies need to develop specific penalty assessment pro-
cedures which satisfy due process requirements.
III. PENALTY ASSESmENT PROCEDURES
A. Federal Penalty Assessment
OSM has revamped the Federal procedures for assessing a
penalty against corporate officers. 93 On October 1, 1983, the
agency issued a directive which sets forth the policy and proce-
dures for implementing the provision.9' OSM's policy is ex-
a 1d.
" Id. (Emphasis added.)
- KRS § 350.990(9) (1984).
", 2D ANNUAL EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 65.
92 See, e.g., 24 NAT. Ras. J. 801, 804 (1984). See also supra note 50. While KRS
§ 350.990(9) (1983) was not the provision at issue in Dix Fork, the plaintiff's due process
arguments are analogous.
30 C.F.R. §§ 845.17-.20 contain the federal procedures for civil penalty assess-
ment. OSM issues directives which provide guidelines for implementation.
" Directive, supra note 32, at 4. This document replaces Temporary Directive,
Individual Civil Penalty Assessment, Chapter T52, § 02, Transmittal No. " (April 29,




pressed in two provisions of the directive: (a) general, and (b)
criteria. The procedures are outlined in four provisions.95
OSM's general policy is to "implement the provision as part
of the overall inspection and enforcement program."6 The cri-
teria provisions limit this generally broad policy, by providing
"only where [both site and individual criteria] apply can an
assessment under Section 518(f) be issued.''97 For site criteria to
apply "the permittee or operator must be a corporation, not an
individual partnership or other entity, 9 and the violation must
be "serious."
If site criteria apply, then the individual criteria provisions
identify the individuals against whom the provision can be as-
serted.10 There are three conditions under which individual lia-
bility can be imposed.1°1 The application can arise (1) where an
individual "apparently in charge of the operation at the site
states that he does not intend to comply"' 0 2 with an NOV or
CO being issued; (2) "where there has been personal service of
an NOV or a CO"103 and "personal service of a CO for non-
abatement to the same individual"' who must be "authorized
to act on behalf of the corporation;"'' 0 5 or (3) if the site is
inactive, a written warning must be sent to the president of the
corporation.'°6 Where noncompliance occurs and "a CO for non-
" Id. at 1, 3.
- See Directive, supra note 32, at 1, § 3(a) which provides:
The Office of Surface Mining (OSM) will implement Section 518(f) of the
Act as part of the overall inspection and enforcement program. In addition,
OSM generally will issue individual civil penalties in the same amount as
the penalties issued to the permittee except that the $750 per day minimum
penalty for non-abatement under Section 518(h) does not apply to individ-
uals.
Id.
, Directive, supra note 32, at I.
"Id.
- Id. at 2. Serious violation is defined as a violation that "was assessed more
than 12 points for negligence and more than 7 points for extent of damage according
to the requirements of 30 CFR 723.12(c)(2) and (d)." Id.
' Directive, supra note 32, at 2. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
1, Id.
-0 Directive, supra note 32, at 2.
03 Id.
"Id.
See id. The criteria provision further states the "agent may be a foreman or
other person in a position of authority."
"10 d.
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abatement is issued, the president of the corporation will be
considered for possible issuance of an individual civil penalty."°7
Once all criteria are met, section 518(f) can be imple-
mented.' Thus, the burden of implementing the provision is on
field office inspectors.1°9 Thereafter, the field office director and
Branch of Inspection, Compliance Section are responsible for
notifying the individual of a proposed assessment." 0
Although the discretionary language of the directive may be
an area open to environmentalists' criticism, the federal policy
and procedures guidelines provide needed flexibility and address
two areas of concern. First, the individual criteria identify the
persons against whom an individual civil penalty can be issued.
Second, due process considerations are built into the policy and:
procedures.
B. State Penalty Assessment
As a follow-up to its annual evaluation of Kentucky's Per-,
manent Program,"' OSM recommended and the Cabinet agreed
See Directive, supra note 32, at 3. Under the third condition, an inactive mine
site, only the president of the corporation can be held individually liable.
- Id. at 3.
Id. Section 3(cX2) lists the responsibilities and duties of the inspectors:
For all CO's for non-abatement there must be a written record stating
which criteria might apply and which apparently do not apply. This written
record must be initiated with the inspection report and immediately brought
to the attention of the supervisor. Where there is an apparently inactive
site, a letter must be written to the president of the corporation informing
him or her of the possible eligibility for an individual civil penalty, in the
event of non-compliance. Note that this written notice must be sent at the
time the NOV or CO's for significant imminent harm or danger where the
inspector believes none of the criteria above apply, there need be no written
record explicitly stating that the criteria have been considered but do not
apply. However, from reading an inspection report where an NOV or CO
for significant imminent harm or danger was issued it should be evident
to the reader that there were no grounds for considering a possible indi-
vidual penalty. Because of the time constraints under Section 518(c) of the
Act and the additional burden of implementing Section 518(f), inspectors
must do all follow-up paperwork for CO's for non-abatement and for
significant imminent harm or danger within three working days of issuance
of the CO.
Id.
,, Id. If an individual is notified of a proposed assessment, he will be afforded
the same hearings and conference procedures as for regular penalties.
" See 2D A urAL EvALUATION, supra note 11; see also supra note 7.
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"to draft and implement necessary policy and procedures ...
for the use of individual civil penalty sanctions." 112 In addition,
OSM said "this policy should include substantial Department
involvement from the early stages to increase the use and effec-
tiveness of this procedure.""' 3 In drafting individual civil penalty
assessment procedures, the Cabinet had to work within statutory
impositions of minimum and maximum standards. SMCRA sets
a threshhold standard as a condition of approval of a state
program." 4 A maximum stringency for state regulations is estab-
lished by the Kentucky Act." 5
The Cabinet has completed its task of drafting the civil
penalty assessment procedures."16 Although the new system es-
tablishes Cabinet-wide policy and procedures, it fails to identify
clearly the individuals potentially affected. However, the proce-
dures expressly provide for issuance of an NOV to officers,
directors, and agents who are listed on the permit application."
1 7
In addition, an NOV may also be issued to "any agent on site
2 See 2D ANNUAL EVALUATION, supra note 11.
' Id. This recommendation is inapposite to the hearing judge's finding in Leslie
Coal, I REP. No. 9. 121. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
11 SMCRA § 518(i) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1268(i) (1982)) requires:
As a condition of approval of any State program submitted pursuant to
Section 1253 of this title, the civil and criminal penalty provisions thereof
shall, at a minimum, incorporate penalties no less stringent than those set
forth in this section, and shall contain the same or similar procedural
requirements relating thereto. Nothing herein shall be construed so as to
eliminate any additional enforcement right or procedures which are avail-
able under State law to a State regulatory authority but which are not
specifically enumerated herein.
"I KRS § 350.069 (Supp. 1984) establishes a maximum stringency of regulations:
To make the state program no more stringent than the federal program,
effective October 1, 1984, the cabinet shall, within thirty (30) days of
publication of final rulemaking in the federal register, promulgate those
regulations that are consistent with and no less effective than the federal
regulations promulgated pursuant to Public Law 95-87, the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and by having such regulations in
full force and effect within sixty (60) days thereafter unless a public hearing
is requested. In the event a public hearing is held, the regulations shall be
implemented within thirty (30) days after the hearing. (Enact. Acts 1984,
ch. 190, § 1, effective July 13, 1984).
'1 The new system for implementation of KRS § 350.990(9) became effective Jan.
1, 1985. Knarr, New Procedures on Civil Penalties, Determination of "Pattern Viola-
tions," Ky. Coal J., March 1985, at 25.
"I Ky. Dept. of Nat. Res. and Environmental Protection (DNREP), Memorandum
to Commissioner, Dept. Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Dec. 7, 1984
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
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actually performing the work."" 8 This ambiguous and vague
language complicates the already difficult task of identifying the
individuals to whom the Kentucky provision is potentially ap-
plicable. Until this language is officially interpreted by the Cab-
inet, the commissioner's comments may provide insight.
According to the commissioner, under the old system, an
officer of a corporate permittee charged with unabated violations
often complained that he did not have personal knowledge of
the violation." 9 Thus, the corporate officer contended that he
was not afforded an opportunity to abate the violation because
he had no knowledge of it. This most often occurred in two
situations. First, the corporate permittee may have had a con-
tractual arrangement with another operator to mine the coal. If
the contract miner was guilty of a non-compliance violation, the
corporate officer may have never been informed. Second, the
corporate permittee's own foreman may have failed to inform
the officer of an NOV.' 20 From the commissioner's comments,
one could infer "any agent on site actually performing the
work''2 includes both a contract miner and a corporate per-
mittee's foreman. It is not clear whether the language also in-
cludes a mere employee working on the site.' 22
"Agent" appears again in the procedure for issuance of a
CO. Here the procedures provide for issuance of a CO to agents
"known to the Cabinet."' 23 This use of agent may be a short-
hand expression encompassing both agents listed on the permit
application and agents "actually on site performing the work."' 2 4
Another interpretation could be that of an agent neither listed
on the permit application nor actually working on the site but
who, nevertheless, is responsible for policy-making or operation
of the mine. 25 In addition to placing an impossible burden on
the Cabinet, this broad interpretation could result in an individ-
' Id. at 1.
"' Knarr, Ky. Coal J., March 1985, at 25.
'I Id.
"' Memorandum, supra note 116, at 1.
, See supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of "agent" under SMCRA; see also Dix Fork, 692 F.2d 436; see
generally 24 NAT. REs. J. 801 (1984).
"2 Memorandum, supra note 112, at 2.
Id. at 1.
,' Dix Fork, 692 F.2d at 440.
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ual being issued a CO without first having been issued an NOV.
Such an action is beyond the scope of the procedures. According
to the procedures, a CO is to be issued only if an NOV is not
timely abated.' 27 Furthermore, issuing a CO to an individual
who has not first been issued an NOV would defeat the Cabinet's
efforts to eliminate the due process concerns associated with the
enforcement of the provision.'" Therefore, "agent known to the
Cabinet" should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
interpretation given to agent in the procedure for issuing an
NOV.
CONCLUSION
Both the general public and the surface mining industry have
benefited from the surface mining laws and regulations. The
federal/state regulatory programs have established more equally
competitive surface mining practices and have fostered a safer
and healthier environment. While environmentalists tend to judge
the federal/state efforts on the number of violations cited or the
penalties collected, the primary purpose of the program-pro-
tection of society and the environment from the adverse effects
of surface coal mining operations-should not be forgotten.
Regulations alone will not achieve this purpose. The primary
goal of both programs should be the implementation of an
enforcement scheme which will result in the deterrence of surface
mining violations.
The federal and state acts provide the statutory authority
necessary to prevent circumvention of surface mining and recla-
mation laws by individuals operating through sham corporations.
If corporate individuals know that OSM and the Cabinet will
exercise their authority to assess and collect individual civil pen-
alties for violations, these individuals will be induced to comply
with the Act. After all, it is not the Cabinet's intent to place
another burden on those involved with mining; rather, the pur-
pose is to personally inform potentially liable individuals and
give them the opportunity to quickly perform remedial measures
to minimize the penalties assessed against them. Implementation
,16 Id. at 2. This problem does not arise under the federal system. See supra text
accompanying note 104.
" Knarr, Ky. Coal J., March 1985, at 25.
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of the new system should also encourage corporate officers and
directors to establish corporate policies which emphasize com-
pliance with the surface mining and reclamation laws and to
police their own mining operations. With such corporate policies
and procedures and with timely abatement, personal assessment
should seldom occur.
Virginia H. Pistello
